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This  paper  proposes  a new  framework,  based  on  graph  database  theory,  for  encoding  complex  data  on
covert  networks,  mapping  their  structure,  and conducting  a sensitivity  analysis.  The  framework  is  then
applied  to reconstruct  the  terrorist  network  of the  2015–2016  attacks  in Paris  and  Brussels,  and  related
plots  in Europe  by  the  Islamic  State  group.  The  resulting  network  was  found  to  be qualitatively  different
from  the  ideologically-related  Al-Qaeda  network,  having  a  lower  secrecy  and  a lower  mean  degree,  under
different network-generating  assumptions.
© 2016  Elsevier  B.V.  All  rights  reserved.
1. Introduction
How could a covert social network be measured with reasonable
conﬁdence? Unlike data collection for overt social networks, it is
rarely possible, in covert networks, to collect respondent-generated
ties via name generators and name interpreters or even to measure
ties in a uniform manner. Instead researchers are forced to infer and
code their network structure from incomplete, indirect, and uncer-
tain information (Gerdes, 2015). Multiple coding decisions need to
be made regarding how the ties between nodes should be measured
in addition to which nodes to include. This introduces subjectivity
and affects reproducibility. To some extent this is the bane of all net-
work studies, but covert networks pose a special challenge given
the secondary nature of the data.
To address this problem, the paper proposes and demonstrates
a framework to encoding and analyzing covert networks, which has
the advantage of systematically accounting for the uncertainty and
ambiguity of covert network data. The framework relies on newly-
developed methods from graph database theory (see Angles and
Gutierrez 2008; Robinson et al., 2015). The approach allows the
researcher to encode raw data in multi-modal form and then use the
powerful tools of graph databases to project the data into a social
network. Once the network has been projected from the graph
database, it is analyzed using existing methods of social network
analysis. The framework allows the user to conduct a sensitivity
analysis to examine whether the network structure depends upon
∗ Corresponding author at: University of Illinois at Chicago, 1603 W.  Taylor St,
Chicago, IL 60612, United States.
E-mail address: agutfraind.research@gmail.com (A. Gutfraind).
the way the researcher chose to generate their network in terms of
how ties were recorded, how nodes were counted, and how sources
for the information were weighted.
This paper is organized as follows. First, we begin by describing
the problem of using covert network data. Next, we  introduce the
graph database as a tool for studying covert social networks and
compare it to more familiar methods. Third, we  introduce sensi-
tivity analysis based on the graph database framework. Fourth, we
apply this method to the Islamic State (IS) network in Europe that
was responsible for the November 2015 Paris Attack and the March
2016 Brussels Attack and compare it to other covert networks.
Finally, we conclude by discussing the ﬁndings on characterizing
this network, the use of graph databases for covert network anal-
ysis, as well as the broader implications of graph databases for
developing social network data standards and its potential for big
data analytics.
1.1. The Challenges of Covert Network Data
Social network analysis faces a variety of unique data chal-
lenges, especially when it comes to sociocentric data (see Borgatti
et al., 2013; Robins 2015).These range from specifying boundaries
(Laumann et al., 1989), to adequate sample size (Costenbader and
Valente, 2003; Frank, 2011) to issues with various forms of miss-
ing data (Kossinets, 2006). The problems are ampliﬁed with covert
networks because the actors are consciously attempting to con-
ceal or falsify their identities, their attributes, or their connections
(Gerdes, 2015). As a result, the instruments of collecting network
data directly from respondents such as name generators or name
interpreters are usually not available. Data on covert networks
typically come from secondary sources. In the case of terrorist or
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.socnet.2016.10.004
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organized crime networks the data are inferred retroactively from
sources such as physical and electronic surveillance documents
(Morselli, 2009); court records (Baker and Faulkner, 1993); or news
reports (Krebs, 2002). As with any data, the analyst is forced to make
coding decisions before social network analysis can even begin.
There are two issues that arise, which should be kept separate.
The ﬁrst is at the level of analysis and the second is at the level
of measurement.
First, there is the issue of what counts as a tie and to what extent
should different types of ties be distinguished from one another.
Some researchers have criticized the tendency in covert network
analysis to amalgamate multiplex ties such as kinship, friendship,
and organizational roles into a uniplex relation (see Gerdes 2015,
chapter 2). For example, if actor A has a family tie to actor B as well as
an operational tie with him, the combined uniplex relation is often
given a double score. Doing so involves throwing out information
and assigning weights arbitrarily, thus introducing the analyst’s
own biases (ibid). Lumping diverse relationships between actors as
equivalent “ties” without theoretical justiﬁcation introduces bias
at the level of coding analysis.
The second issue is whether the nodes included and their
relationships are in fact correctly measured. There is always the
problem of missing data and whether certain nodes or relations
are simply not known − the false negatives. But there is also the
problem of how accurate are the relationships that are “known”
− the false positives. Measurement error is especially pronounced
for covert networks due to the secondary nature of the data col-
lection. This paper introduces a framework that seeks to reduce
measurement error, though it address both measurement and anal-
ysis errors.
For the purposes of this paper we refer to the problem of mea-
suring and representing relationships in a covert network as the
problem of covert network forensics. Much like a detective trying
to piece together the details of a crime while sifting through a mul-
titude of clues, covert networks forensics involves the systematic
piecing together of information about relationships between nodes.
Data about a covert network are usually obtained after the network
has already carried out its mission. In the case of assembling infor-
mation from disparate sources, there is a great deal of uncertainty
as to which ties and nodes to include. Thus, what is needed is a
framework that has the following four properties.
Documentation
The ability to link speciﬁc network elements (nodes or ties) to
the raw source data as metadata. In this way the data are precisely
documented and can be reproduced and easily re-examined.
Complex representation
The ability to store diverse entities and relations from mul-
tiple modes along with data on multiple types of edges. This
is useful as the available sources often describe multi-modal
relations.1
1 For example, suppose node A and node B shared an apartment in Molenbeek
while node C and node D lived in the same area of Paris. If both pairs are coded as
“co-presence”, one throws away the data that indicates co-presence with respect
to speciﬁc locations (e.g. Molenbeek, Paris). This information might be relevant for
subsequent analysis or by other researchers. While it is possible for the analyst to
go back to her raw data and re-code or for other researchers to contact the original
coder for their raw data, it is not efﬁcient to do so. Ideally, the analyst should input
as  much as possible of the relevant raw data into machine-readable format while
throwing away the least possible amount of information, at the stage of data coding.
Reproducibility
The ability to efﬁciently reproduce coding decisions by other
researchers. Ideally all the coding decisions are documented in a
command script ﬁle.
Multiple projection
The ability to use raw data in multiple ways when deriving the
network’s nodes and edges. This allows the analyst to rerun her
analysis and to test the robustness of one’s network to different
network-generating assumptions. This is especially important for
covert networks because there are many arbitrary decisions that
are made regarding tie measurement.
Traditional packages for social network analysis are not well-
suited for these tasks because it is cumbersome to store so many
different kinds of data: multiple edge attributes, multiple modes,
and non-network data. Indeed many covert network datasets that
are publicly available, even those derived from open sources, are
poorly documented and very difﬁcult to reproduce.
1.2. Graph databases
To respond to these challenges, this paper uses the theory
of graph databases, a relatively new methodology from com-
puter science, to perform covert network forensics. Generally, a
graph database is a knowledge representation system which codes
knowledge using nodes and edges, rather than storing tables of
rows and columns as found in conventional databases (Angles
and Gutierrez 2008; Robinson et al., 2015). Graph databases have
recently matured as a technology and are capable of exceeding,
in some respects, methods of conventional databases, even when
working with data such as tables, text, and images. Because the
internal structure of graph databases is in the form of a net-
work, they are very well-suited to represent the information about
covert networks, including members, activities, events and the rela-
tionships among them, as well as the attributes of the entities
and relationships (Fig. 1). Graph databases can also contain meta-
information about the nodes and edges, including the full text,
image or movie containing the evidence, and this information can
be considered when reconstructing the covert network.
Software implementations of graph databases are also equipped
with a powerful and versatile query language for extracting infor-
mation, analogous to how relational databases are queried using
the SQL language. The query language of the graph database allows
systematic extraction of information from the available raw data
− a method not possible using social network analysis pack-
ages. Using a query, it is possible to determine the members of
a covert network, and the relationships between them by listing
only members and relationships that satisfy a particular condition.
Furthermore, as new data are added to the database, the query can
instantly (i.e., with one command) report the updated structure
of the covert network based on any new information. The query
also facilitates easy sensitivity analysis to determine whether the
covert network is dependent upon the way  the data are being coded
(Kossinets, 2006). The social network resulting from the database
query is then visualized and analyzed using existing social network
tools and methods.
While the most advanced currently available network software
packages have the ability to store multiple types of nodes and
edges as well as their attributes, it is not generally possible in
these systems to perform automated extraction of network infor-
mation based on complex logical criteria. By contrast, the graph
database is well-suited to store and query detailed temporal, spatial
and other attributes about the nodes and relations. For exam-
ple, a query can list all pairs of persons who were present in the
same location within 7 days of a terrorist attack and who also
visited a speciﬁc country in the past 5 years. In general, a graph
database query returns any logical path (a set of one or more linked
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Member 1 
Member 3 
Membe r 2 
Act 1 
Location 1 
Been in (2013) 
Member 4
Involved  in 
Involved  in 
Been in (2012) 
Related to 
Fig. 1. Example of a graph database representation of a four-node covert network, with inferred ties (arcs on the left side). Tie 1–2 (from member 1 to member 2) is inferred
because of their involvement in the same act. Members 2 and 3 were in the same location, but at a different year, and are thus not tied. Tie 3–4 is inferred because members
3  and 4 have a kinship tie to each other. The graph database often stores multiple attributes which cannot be visualized here, but which may  be important for covert network
forensics.
entities) which satisﬁes any speciﬁed logical conditions (Zouzias
et al., 2014), while existing frameworks are designed for ﬁltering
only single nodes and relationships (e.g., all nodes of a particular
kind).
To summarize, the methodology underpinning this paper pro-
vides the following advantages over existing frameworks. First, the
data, including raw documents and extracted attributes is repre-
sented in a graph database, minimizing the need to make most
coding decisions. Second, the database query language provides a
way of extracting complex structural information in a reproducible
way, whereas existing methods are limited to simpler forms of ﬁl-
tering. Finally, the combination of richer data and better queries
also enables a more comprehensive set of projections and sensitiv-
ity analyses. Although current network analysis packages, such as
statnet (Handcock et al., 2003) can, in many cases, support similar
analysis, they lack the ability to store and efﬁciently query large
heterogeneous datasets (>10 GB) in raw form, making it difﬁcult to
work with raw event data.
Our survey of the social network and covert network litera-
ture has found that the graph database method is substantially
novel, with only a handful of papers using the graph database
framework for network analysis, largely by engineers and com-
puter scientists, and no published studies have applied it to covert
networks. The graph database method could be viewed as a gener-
alization of multi-modal network analysis, as discussed in Breiger
et al. (2014) and Lindelauf et al. (2012), who argued that terrorist
networks could be represented as a multi-modal networks linking
individuals based on their afﬁliation to missions or targets. It also
extends the method of multi-relational (also known as multiplex)
network analysis, common in covert network analysis (Everton,
2012; Xu and Chen, 2008), in which the network allows for dif-
ferent types of relationships (family, friendship, recruiter, etc.) but
all the nodes in the network are of one type, such as persons. This is
distinguished from a graph database framework advocated here in
which the nodes are of several types, both human actors and non-
human nodes (locations, events, attacks) and are connected with
multiple types of relationships. The frameworks are compared in
Table 1. Once data are stored in the graph database, it is usually pro-
2 Neo4j: Neo Technology, Inc. San Mateo, CA. 2016. Available from: https://
neo4j.com/product/ : UciNet: Borgatti, S.P., Everett, M.G. and Freeman, L.C. 2002.
Ucinet for Windows: Software for Social Network Analysis. Harvard, MA:  Ana-
lytic Technologies. Available from: https://sites.google.com/site/ucinetsoftware/
downloadshttps://sites.google.com/site/ucinetsoftware/downloads ; Networkx:
networkx team. 2014. Available from: https://networkx.github.iohttps://networkx.
github.io ; Statnet: Mark S. Handcock, David R. Hunter, Carter T. Butts, Steven M.
Goodreau, and Martina Morris. 2003. Available from: http://statnetproject.org;
jected into the multi-relational or the simple graph framework and
then analyzed as a social network. Therefore, the graph database
framework is not a new method for analyzing multiplex multimodal
networks, but rather, its key contribution is to enable the encoding
of raw data and then deriving the network from it.
We apply the graph database framework to two major recent
terrorist events. On November 13, 2015 a set of coordinated attacks
in Paris, France took the lives of 130 people and caused more than
350 injuries. Just months later, on March 22, 2016 the same network
struck transportation hubs in Brussels killing 32 and injuring over
300. The attacks are considered one of the worst terrorist atroci-
ties in Europe, and one of the deadliest attacks in an OECD country
since the 9/11 attack in the US (START, 2013). The attacks were
organized by the Islamic State group (IS), and carried out by a net-
work we refer to as IS in Europe (or IS-E). IS-E has been operating
in Western Europe for several years, and could be linked to several
smaller operations: the attack on the Jewish Museum of Belgium
(May 2014), the interdicted plot in Verviers (January 2015)(Crilly,
2015), and the high-speed train attack on the Brussels-Paris line
(August 2015) (Parlapiano et al., 2015). However, IS-E does not
include the Charlie Hebdo attacks, which are attributed to an unre-
lated group afﬁliated with al-Qaida (Schmitt et al., 2015) nor does
it include acts by self-starter Islamists who  are not directed by or
afﬁliated with any known terrorist organization.
Because of the extensive interest in the Paris attacks and related
plots, considerable information is available about the IS-E network
in the open media. Based on this data, a graph database was built
and it includes IS-E members, attacks, terrorist activities, sites,
locations, and countries (see Methods). Following the creation of
the database, we inferentially obtained a social network between
the human actors and analyzed this IS-E network. Speciﬁcally, we
aimed to provide a visual summary of the overall plot, and to under-
stand the structure of the social network that made the attack
possible.
We evaluated the IS-E network using measures like density,
clustering, diameter, and several specialized measures such as
secrecy. We then performed a sensitivity analysis to evaluate
whether the measurements depend on how the ties are inferred.
Igraph: igraph team. 2003. Available from: http://igraph.org ; Pnet: P Wang, G
Robins, P Pattison 2006. “PNet A program for the simulation and estimation of expo-
nential random graph models” University of Melbourne. Available from: http://
www.swinburne.edu.au/fbl/research/transformative-innovation/our-research/
MelNet-social-network-group/PNet-software/index.htmlTitan: Titan community.
2015. Available from: https://github.com/thinkaurelius/titan ;DSE Graph: DataStax
Analytics, Inc, Santa Clara, CA. 2016. Available from: http://www.datastax.com/
products/datastax-enterprise-graph.
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Table 1
Comparison of frameworks for covert network forensics.
Simple Graph Multi-relational Multi-modal Graph Database
Nodes Types 1 (Persons) 1 (Persons) 1 or more (Persons and other entities) 1 or more (Persons and other entities)
Edges  Types 1 1 or more 1 1 or more
Raw  Source Information External External External Internal
Storage Capacitya <106 <106 <106 >109
Representative Software2 NetworkX, Igraph Ucinet, Statnet, PNet Neo4j, Titan, DSE Graph
a Capacity of nodes and edges is based on leading implementations: Neo4 j v3.0.1, UciNet 6.605, Statnet 2015.11.0, Titan 1.0.0.
Finally, we compared the IS-E network to other covert organi-
zational networks. We found that IS-E has lower mean degree
compared to al-Qaida, as well as, intriguingly − lower secrecy (as
deﬁned in Lindelauf et al., 2009).
To sum, our main contribution is to propose a new methodology
for systematic representation and analysis of covert networks, and
secondarily, to map  the Islamic Sate network in Europe. A practical
outcome of this work for counter-terrorism is to better understand
the structure and any vulnerabilities of terrorist networks, assisting
future identiﬁcation of leaders and other counter-terrorism inter-
diction activities.
2. Methods
2.1. Data
Data from media sources were collected from Nov. 17, 2015 to
May  9, 2016 by coding large-circulation media sources, particularly
French, Dutch, and English-language daily newspapers online as
well as the Lexis (formerly known as Lexis-Nexis) database. The
full text of sources of the articles are included in an online website
complementary to this paper.3
2.2. Graph database analysis
2.2.1. Nodes
The following classes of nodes were used:
1. Persons: Human actors with the attributes age, gender, role, citi-
zenship and status (free, wanted, or dead). They were also coded
with a role attribute: weapons, logistics (other than weapons),
leadership (recruiter, planner).
2. Attacks: Attack events including “successful” operations as well
as interdicted plots.
3. Activities: Missions related to covert activities or terrorism
(e.g. in/exﬁltrations, weapon preparation, etc.) and activities not
related to covert missions or attacks (e.g. family circle, sports
club).
4. Sites: Geographical places with addresses where all present
likely know each other (e.g. private residences, safe houses, and
staging sites).
5. Localities: Larger locations such as communities and cities com-
monly reported as places of residence.
6. Countries: Sovereign states visited for covert activities.
To build the IS-E network, we started from attacks, which were
only included if they were claimed by IS (or IS-inspired actors)
and were also orchestrated by IS-E leadership. Although IS inspired
and orchestrated other attacks in Europe, they were not included
in IS-E if there was little evidence of any operational connections
to IS-E. Only attacks that had formal IS members with links to IS
were included. We  next sought out news reports about the attacks,
3 https://github.com/sashagutfraind/nov13/.
and extracted names and relationships using our coding scheme
above.
The next step used graph database queries to deﬁne the network
boundaries for the IS-E network. Namely, individuals were included
based on the following criteria: (1) Attackers (i.e. used/planned
to use a weapon on a particular target); (2) Known to have been
involved with an attacker/actor in a covert/terrorism-related task
(as organizers or in logistical roles); (3) Wanted or arrested in
relation to the attacks for unspeciﬁed reasons. Thus, for IS-E,
any individual that assisted a wanted or dead member of IS-E is
included, but not individuals who  played no known role (such as
innocent family members). Detailed query logic, the analysis pro-
gram, the database, and raw media data are linked to this paper and
are also made available publicly through the GitHub collaborative
repository: http://github.com/sashagutfraind/nov13/.
2.2.2. Relationships
The database contains person to entity relations, as well as a rel-
atively small number of person to person relations. Covert network
forensics is often reliant on information, which belongs to several
fairly well-characterized types: (1) Person Involved-In Attack: a
person that actively participated in an attack on a particular site; (2)
Person Involved-In Activity: a person who participated in a covert
mission or a non-covert group or activity; (3) Person Linked-To Per-
son: a pair of linked persons due to kinship, afﬁnity, operational
work, or unspeciﬁed reasons; (4) Person Present-In Site, Locality
or Country: an individual connected to a location, including dates
if available, where he or she is known to have resided in, tem-
porarily stayed in, or countries visited (if relevant to the covert
mission). When recording the relationship in the graph database,
we also recorded the speciﬁc source that reported it. In the case of
IS-E, most of the sources were large circulation media sources in
English and French. The web link to the source was also stored in
the database.
For the IS-E network, two individuals were tied to each other in
the social network on one of several grounds, where one is sufﬁ-
cient for a tie: if they were involved in an attack on the same target,
jointly involved in a covert-related activity, were present in the
same location and are both suspected of a covert activity. A pre-
existing strong tie (kinship, friendship or other) was also grounds
for a tie, as long as both persons were included as members of IS-E
(see above criteria). Ties projected based on location were exam-
ined closely as part of the sensitivity analysis (see below). While
such ties are expected to be genuine operational ties particularly
when the location is small (e.g. two  persons living in the same a safe
house), in some cases are spurious (e.g. two  persons living in the
same area of Brussels) and so including them would have increased
the false positive rate.
2.2.3. Representation of covert network data in a graph database
In our analysis we used the free and open-source Neo4j database
and its Cypher query language (Miller 2013; Robinson et al., 2015;
Webber 2012), but the analysis does not depend on this speciﬁc
tool and it could be implemented using any graph database soft-
ware. Neo4j can be accessed either with Cypher or from common
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Box 1: Sample code in the Cypher language to create a pair of nodes and an edge. Actual database contains more
attributes (see above). The ‘‘ref1’’ attribute stores a reference to the media source.
Box 2: Sample code in the Cypher language for querying the graph database. The code produces tables of matches
which are loaded into igraph for network analysis.
languages such as Java, R and Python. The syntax of Cypher is illus-
trated in Box 1 and 2.
Our data processing was based on the R language. As a ﬁrst step,
we used the open-source RNeo4j library for R to load the raw data
into the Neo4j database. Next, we used RNeo4j to query the database
and obtain lists of matching nodes and relationships. Finally, we
performed social network analysis using the open-source igraph
software4 for R. All statistical analysis used the R stats package.5
2.2.4. Sensitivity analysis
The greatest source of uncertainty in the IS-E network has to do
with using co-location to infer ties. For this reason we  considered
several variants of the IS-E network: (1) IS-E restricted: this net-
work only has ties for persons who were jointly involved in attacks
or covert activities or had a pre-existing link. Sharing of space is
not considered, thus it excludes ties of members who e.g. lived in
the same house. (2) IS-E extended: expanded the IS-E network by
tying two members whenever they were at the same locality (for
IS-E members, it was often Molenbeek) or afﬁliated with a non-
covert activity. We  obtained these three networks by modifying
the queries to the graph database.
2.2.5. Social network metrics
The resulting networks were studied structurally, based on
several metrics that were previously used to characterize covert
networks, particularly terrorist networks (Helfstein and Wright
2011; Krebs 2002; Lindelauf et al., 2009). The basic metrics were:
density (number of edges divided by the number of edges in a com-
plete network), clustering (the number of actual triads divided by
the possible) and the diameter (the length of the shortest path
between the most distant pair of individuals) − a measure of the
communication time across the network. We  also considered efﬁ-
ciency, a measure of the network’s ability to perform terrorist
operations as computed from the harmonic mean of person-to-
person distances (Gutfraind, 2010) and secrecy S1, the fraction of
4 Version 1.0.1.
5 Version 3.3.1.
the network that remains unexposed if a single person is detected
(Lindelauf et al., 2009). Both efﬁciency and secrecy range in [0,1]
with 1 considered the maximal possible for a network. Terror-
ist networks tend to be highly modular (organized into cells)
(Sageman, 2004), which enables them to operate covertly and avoid
accidental exposure. To measure modularity, we used a modular-
ity score originally proposed by (Newman and Girvan, 2004) and
calculated it using the Louvain approach of Blondel et al. (2008).
This modularity measure identiﬁes the optimal separation of the
network into communities (including their number) and computes
a modularity score in [0,1] that reﬂects how strongly is the network
separable (1 being the highest).
2.2.6. Media coverage sensitivity data
In order to examine a possible relationship between media cov-
erage and the structure of the network, information about media
coverage was sought for all the individuals in the network. Using
Lexis (formerly Lexis-Nexis), we  determined (1) total number of
English-language articles about the individual (up to May  27, 2016),
(2) the date of ﬁrst coverage, and (3) the date of last coverage. From
the dates we calculated the duration of coverage in days for each
actor. The results were correlated with network attributes such as
degree, betweenness centrality, and the local clustering coefﬁcient.
2.2.7. Comparison of terrorist networks
We compared the IS-E network to several datasets from past
covert networks (Table 2). The motivation for doing so was  to
see if there are some underlying similarities among covert net-
works that organize political violence. A particularly signiﬁcant
empirical reference are networks afﬁliated with al-Qaida, which
competes with IS in the radical Islamist milieu (Watts, 2016). We
also included networks from other terrorist organizations and a
covert non-terrorist network (FTP), in order to determine whether
IS-E has distinct properties when compared to other covert net-
works. Next, we  extracted from the IS-E network the operational
subnetwork responsible for the 2015–2016 attacks in Paris and
Brussels (termed, IS-E supercell) and compared it to several opera-
tional networks under al-Qaida’s control, including the 9/11 attacks
in the US and the March 11 attack in Madrid. Operational networks
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Table 2
Network datasets which were compared to IS-E.
Network Dates Type Movement Source
9/11 attacker network 2001 Terrorist, Operational Islamist radicals (Krebs, 2002)
Strasbourg Cathedral plot 2000 Terrorist, Operational Islamist radicals (Xu and Chen, 2008)
Bali  Bombings network 2002 Terrorist, Operational Islamist radicals (JJATT, 2009)
Madrid bombers (M11) 2003 Terrorist, Operational Islamist radicals (Rodriguez, 2004)
Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) 2000–2005 Terrorist,
Operational
Islamist radicals (Everton, 2012)
Jakarta  hotel bombings 2009 Terrorist, Operational Islamist radicals (JJATT, 2009)
al-Qaida global 2001 Terrorist, Organizational Islamist radicals (Xu and Chen, 2008)
Francs-tireurs et Partisans (FTP) 1941–1945 Urban insurgency, Organizational World War  II Resistance (Gutfraind, 2010)
Revolutionary
Org.  November
17 (17N)
1975–2002 Terrorist, Organizational Marxist (JJATT, 2009)
are organized to carry out a single operation (or related operations)
and, unlike organizational networks, do not include the leadership
or the auxiliary echelons of the organization.
3. Results
3.1. The structure of the Islamic State in Europe (IS-E) network
Applying the graph database framework to the IS-E network
resulted in a database of 119 nodes and 232 relationships. The core
of the database consists of nodes of type Attack, Person, Activity,
and Site; as well as the relationships between them, represented in
Fig. 2. Further, the network contains 71 persons who have the fol-
lowing demographic characteristics.6 The mean age is 28 (Range:
13–40) and the gender distribution is 99% male (69 males and 1
female). The most common countries of citizenships are: Belgium
− 29 (41%), France − 18 (25%) and Algeria − 5 (7%).
A striking feature of the network is the high degree centrality of
the A. Abaaoud node, i.e., his high number of connections to persons
and entities. He is one of the ﬁeld leaders of the Nov. 13 attacks, as
well as the organizer of previous attacks by IS-E. The node of S.
Abdeslam, another leader, is also high in degree. Moreover, many
of the actors have multiple paths to each other, suggesting that the
network is relatively robust to the arrest of bridging individuals.
Applying the projection procedure to the database (see Meth-
ods), we obtained a covert social network with 71 individuals and
146 undirected relationships. This reveals the cells involved in the
attacks, which appear as cliques (Fig. 3). Each of the attacks cells
(e.g. Stade de France, Café Bonne Bière, the Bataclan Theater) are
distinguished. Other cells include the smuggling cell of S. Abdeslam,
the cell responsible for exﬁltration of Ahmet Dahmani, the group
around St. Denis and ﬁnally the IS leadership grouping, which is
connected to A. Abaaoud. Abaaoud and S. Abdeslam are clearly vital
for connecting the network.
The degree of a node can highlight its relative importance to the
network (Krebs 2002). Examining the degrees of the nodes in IS-E
(Fig. 4A) it could be seen that A. Abaaoud has the highest degree
followed by S. Abdeslam. The same nodes also have the highest
betweenness centrality (Fig. 4B). Indeed, Abdelhamid Abaaoud is
believed to be a leader of IS-E and he was responsible for multiple
terror attacks in Europe while S. Abdeslam is known as one of the
co-leaders, possibly with an additional person (Rubin, 2015). People
loosely tied to the plot have the lowest degree. Thus, in IS-E just as
in other Islamist groups, the degree of the node appears to be a
reliable indicator of leadership role (Medina, 2014) − a ﬁnding that
may  assist future counter-terrorism investigations.
6 One person has no available attributes.
3.2. Dependence of network structure on media coverage
We  obtained media coverage information for 66 individuals out
of a total of 71 in the network. The remaining ﬁve persons never
had their names identiﬁed in any open sources, making it difﬁcult
to estimate the true coverage. The median number of English-
language articles was 96.5 (range: 3–16052). The median duration
of coverage was 136.5 days (range: 1–1715). Univariate regression
model of duration on the number of articles was not signiﬁcant
(F-test: p > 0.45).
We  tested for a possible relationship between coverage vari-
ables and three outcomes: the degree, betweenness centrality, and
the person’s clustering coefﬁcient. We  found that the duration in
the news was not signiﬁcant in any of the three outcomes, when
controlling for number of articles (F-test: p > 0.17). In this multi-
variate regression analysis, a positive linear relationship was found
between degree and the number of articles (estimate: 0.00178,
standard deviation (SD): 0.000173), the betweenness (estimate:
0.0665, SD: 0.0072) and clustering (estimate: −6.70e-05 SD: 1.50e-
05) with high signiﬁcance in all cases (F-test: p < 0.0001). Thus, an
increase of 1.78 in the degree of a person in IS-E is associated with
additional 1000 media articles. The adjusted R-squared values in
the three regressions are 0.66, 0.60 and 0.30, respectively. When
removing two outliers ( > 5000 articles), the adjusted R-squared
values are 0.43, 0.35, 0.37, respectively.
3.3. Structural network analysis and comparison to other covert
networks
Table 3 shows the structural properties of the IS-E network and
compares IS-E to other organizational networks in our dataset.
Table 3 shows that IS-E is one of the smallest networks, and it has
a relatively low mean degree as compared to all other organizations.
It also has a low secrecy score, as compared to al-Qaida and FTP, but
higher than 17N and JI. The clustering of IS-E is lower than FTP and
JI, but higher than al-Qaida. The modularity is intermediate and
comparable to al-Qaida.
Although IS-E is the best estimate of the true network of IS
behind these attacks, the graph database allowed us to evaluate the
sensitivity of the results by considering alternative assumptions.
We  considered two such alternative assumptions with correspond-
ing variant networks: (1) the only real ties are those around terrorist
activities or known links (IS-E restricted), and (2) many ties were
unreported and individuals should be tied when they shared a site,
location or a non-covert activity (IS-E extended). Under this evalu-
ation, the relatively low degree, higher clustering and low secrecy
of the IS-E network as compared to al-Qaida is robust to how the
network was inferred. However, the clustering increases substan-
tially in IS-E extended, which implies that clustering is dependent
on the assumptions used to infer the network.
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Fig. 2. The nodes and relationship in the IS-E network in the graph database representation: attacks (red), activities (yellow), persons (blue) and sites (gray). To reduce
clutter, localities and countries are not shown. (For interpretation of the references to color in this ﬁgure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
Table 3
Network properties of IS-E and of other covert organizational networks.
Organization Nodes Edges Components Diameter Density Mean
Degree
Clustering Efﬁciency Secrecy Modularity
IS-E 71 146 7 5 0.059 4.11 0.27 0.36 0.93 0.55
IS-E  extendeda 71 222 7 5 0.089 6.25 0.53 0.40 0.90 0.50
IS-E  restrictedb 71 117 12 5 0.047 3.30 0.25 0.30 0.94 0.59
17N  18 46 1 2 0.30 4.11 0.50 0.65 0.66 0.21
al-Qaida 368 1481 5 7 0.02 8.05 0.16 0.33 0.98 0.56
FTP  174 264 1 9 0.02 3.03 0.41 0.20 0.98 0.81
JI  79 623 2 14 0.20 15.77 0.56 0.56 0.79 0.33
a IS-E extended: extends IS-E by including ties based on sites and locality of residence. bIS-E restricted: includes only ties based on known terrorist activity, attacks, or
personal links.
Table 4
Comparison of covert operational networks.
Operations Nodes Edges Components Diameter Density Mean
Degree
Clustering Efﬁciency Secrecy Modularity
IS-E supercella 49 109 3 5 0.093 4.449 0.305 0.427 0.889 0.470
9/11  62 152 1 5 0.08 4.90 0.36 0.40 0.90 0.53
Bali  2002 17 158 1 3 0.45 11.7 0.72 0.72 0.53 0.22
Jakarta  2009 28 38 3 4 0.10 2.71 0.36 0.22 0.87 0.61
Madrid  M11  70 240 7 6 0.10 6.86 0.57 0.37 0.89 0.46
Strasbourg 18 26 2 5 0.17 2.89 0.13 0.45 0.78 0.38
a The subnetwork of IS-E responsible for the 2015–2016 attacks in Paris and Brussels.
Focusing on the supercell responsible for the Paris and Brussels
attacks, we found that this subnetwork contains 69% of the nodes
of the IS-E network. We  also compared the Paris/Brussels supercell
to operational networks from past attacks by al-Qaida (Table 2).
In this comparison, the supercell was found to have a relatively
low mean degree (but not the lowest) and low clustering. From
the lower mean degree ﬁgure, we hypothesize that IS-E might use
smaller cells as compared to al-Qaida (Table 4).
4. Discussion
Our study proposed a framework based on graph databases to
document and infer covert networks relying on data drawn from
large-circulation open media sources. The framework has several
advantages over existing approaches in the areas of reproducibil-
ity, documentation, complexity of representation, and multiple
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Fig. 3. Plot of the IS-E actor network. The network nodes represent all the individuals involved in the covert organization, and the edges link individuals that probably
interacted with each other. Additional singleton nodes (6) are not shown (see degrees in Fig. 4A).
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Fig. 4. Node centrality of the IS-E actor network. (A) Node degree centrality and (B) Betweenness centrality.
projection of the data. The framework was applied to represent
the network of the Islamic State group in Western Europe (IS-E).
For the Islamic State in Europe (IS-E), it was found that IS-E lead-
ers at the operational level could be identiﬁed by their much higher
degree and betweenness centrality, which is consistent with past
studies of al-Qaida (Krebs, 2002; Medina, 2014). Because the lead-
ers of the IS-E network have relatively high degree, the IS network
might be organized to maximize the leaders’ efﬁciency, i.e., abil-
ity to recruit and carry out attacks. This efﬁciency comes at the
cost of lowered security by subjecting the leaders to interception
and arrest (Gutfraind, 2010). The efﬁciency-security tradeoff7 may
have been buffered by the documented adoption of new crypto-
graphic communication technologies in planning and coordinating
the IS-E attacks (see Rotella, 2016). Examination of the IS-E network
suggested that its network could be characterized by relatively low
mean degree and low secrecy, as compared to the al-Qaida network.
Taken together, IS-E could be characterized by relatively small cells
of about four persons, which are somewhat loosely knit together, as
indicated by the lower secrecy score. The ﬁnding undermines the
hypothesis that all covert networks, or at least, all covert networks
7 See Morselli et al. (2007) for a good discussion of the security-efﬁciency tradeoff.
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in a particular operational milieu would have a similar network
structure (Gutfraind, 2010; Lindelauf et al., 2009).
Even with more time and more data, there are basic limita-
tions to the process of reconstructing covert network structure
when relying on exclusively public media sources. It is likely that
some ties between the individuals might not be revealed for secu-
rity reasons until many years after the attack. Fortunately, because
information about arrests and arrest warrants is public and widely
reported, the public record has good coverage of IS-E operations
surrounding the recent attacks. Indeed, those ties that were consis-
tently reported by multiple independent media sources are likely
to be real. There are also particular difﬁculties in the case of the
IS-E because its commanders are based in Syria, and hence some of
its higher echelons are not characterized in detail, although some
were reported and included in our database.
We found evidence of a positive correlation between a suspect’s
network properties, particularly, degree and betweenness, and the
number of articles on that person. This ﬁnding is intriguing but of
course does not indicate causality. We  hypothesize that there is a
mutually reinforcing effect whereby greater terrorist activity leads
to greater media coverage, as well as media coverage giving greater
network information. The number of articles is positively related to
degree (R-squared = 0.43), a ﬁnding that sets an upper bound on the
number of missing links in our data − approximately 2 additional
links per 1000 articles. Because the median number of articles per
person is just 96, which is much less than a 1000, the effect is small.
It implies that a typical node, which has a degree of 4.1, has an error
of at most 0.2 links in its degree, or just 5%.
The comparison of terrorist networks requires that they are
coded using the same framework, though this is not current
practice. Indeed, there are systematic differences in how various
authors deﬁne membership and relationships in the covert net-
works they study, which are often not possible to reconstruct and
reanalyze. We  have attempted to address this problem, and indeed
this is our main contribution, by including raw data in the graph
database, automating the process of building the social network,
and testing our ﬁndings using sensitivity analysis. We  publicly
share our code and data, and encourage other researchers to exam-
ine them and perhaps add to the analysis.
Indeed, part of the great advantage of graph databases is that
they allow for the cumulative development of social network
knowledge. It may  be desirable for the social network community
to adopt standards for coding secondary network data using graph
databases such that all the decisions of the analyst are carefully doc-
umented for future researchers to replicate and build upon. This is
in contrast to current practice where coding decisions are largely
hidden and are not easily reproducible by subsequent researchers.
Given the power of graph databases, we argue that these meth-
ods could considerably advance covert network forensics, and
social network analysis in general, by enabling more consistent
data aggregation and automatic sensitivity analysis of the results.
As the ﬁeld is increasingly adopting Big Data methods such as
machine learning and natural language processing, it is likely that
information extraction including network information extraction
would become increasingly automated. It would be possible, in the
near future, to build an automated system that would continuously
read public media sources about a particular event, such as a terror
attack, represent the data in a graph database, and produce a robust
estimate of the underlying covert network.
5. Conclusion
This study proposes the use of graph databases to obtain a high-
resolution map  of covert networks based on public media sources
and perform structural inference. The analysis method was applied
to the Islamic State network responsible for the November 2015
Paris Attack and the March 2016 Brussels Attack as well as related
plots. Our study is one of the ﬁrst to examine the structure of a
network operated by the Islamic State, and to compare it to other
covert networks. We  found that the network, as compared to al-
Qaida operations, has a lower secrecy, which may make it relatively
more vulnerable to interdiction.
An important direction for future research is to standardize the
coding of clandestine and terrorist networks to enable a more con-
sistent comparison of their structure. This promises to highlight
universal patterns as well as systematic differences in the organi-
zation of these networks. The graph database framework offers an
efﬁcient way  to do so.
Acknowledgement
The authors wish to thank Roy Lindelauf for detailed feedback.
AG was partly supported by Uptake Technologies, Inc. and National
Institutes of Health grant R01AI101229.
Appendix A. Supplementary data
Supplementary data associated with this article can be found,
in the online version, at http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.socnet.2016.10.
004.
References
Angles, Renzo, Gutierrez, Claudio, 2008. Survey of graph database models. ACM
Comput. Surv. (CSUR) 40 (1), 1–39.
Baker, Wayne E., Faulkner, Robert R., 1993. The social organization of conspiracy:
illegal networks in the heavy electrical equipment industry. Am.  Sociol. Rev. 58
(6),  837–860.
Blondel, D.Vincent, Guillaume, Jean-Loup, Lambiotte Renaud, Lambiotte, Renaud,
Lefebvre, Etienne, 2008. Fast unfolding of communities in large networks. J.
Stat. Mech: Theory Exp. 2008 (10) (P10008).
Borgatti, S.P., Everett, M.G., Johnson, J.C., 2013. Analyzing Social Networks. SAGE
Publications, London, UK.
Breiger, Ronald L., Schoon, Eric, Melamed, David, Asal, Victor, Karl Rethemeyer, R.,
2014. Comparative conﬁgurational analysis as a two-mode network problem:
a  study of terrorist group engagement in the drug trade. Soc. Netw. 36, 23–39.
Costenbader, E., Valente, T.W., 2003. The stability of centrality measures when
networks are sampled. Soc. Netw. 25 (2), 283–307.
Crilly, Rob, 2015. Police Detain Suspected Ringleader of Belgian Terror Cell, Says
Source. in (Retrieved: 04.04.16 http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/
europe/greece/11353214/Greek-police-detain-suspected-ringleader-of-
Belgian-terror-cell-says-source.html).
Everton, Sean F., 2012. Disrupting Dark Networks. Cambridge University Press,
New York, NY.
Frank, Ove, 2011. Survey sampling in networks. In: Scott, J.C., Carrington, Peter J.
(Eds.), The Sage Handbook of Social Network Analysis. SAGE Publications,
London, UK, pp. 390–402.
Gerdes, Luke M.,  2015. Illuminating Dark Networks: The Study of Clandestine
Groups and Organizations. Cambridge University Press, New York.
Gutfraind, Alexander, 2010. Optimizing topological cascade resilience based on the
structure of terrorist networks. PLoS One 5 (11), e13448.
Handcock, Mark S., Hunter, David R., Butts, Carter T., Goodreau, Steven M., Morris,
Martina, 2003. Statnet: Software Tools for the Statistical Modeling of Network
Data, Available from: http://statnetproject.org.
Helfstein, Scott, Wright, Dominick, 2011. Covert or convenient? evolution of terror
attack networks. J. Conﬂ. Resol. 55 (5), 785–813.
JJATT, 2009. John Jay & Artis Transnational Terrorism Database. John Jay College,
City University of New York (Available from: http://doitapps.jjay.cuny.edu/
jjatt/index.php).
Kossinets, Gueorgi., 2006. Effects of missing data in social networks. Soc. Netw. 28
(3),  247–268.
Krebs, Valdis E., 2002. Mapping networks of terrorist cells. Connections 24 (3),
43–52.
Laumann, Edward O, Marsden, Peter V, Prensky, David, 1989. The boundary
speciﬁcation problem in network analysis. In: Freeman, L.C., White, D.R.,
Romney, A.K. (Eds.), Research Methods in Social Network Analysis. Transaction
Publishers, New Brunswick, NJ, pp. 61–68.
Lindelauf, Roy, Borm, Peter, Hamers, Herbert, 2009. The inﬂuence of secrecy on the
communication structure of covert networks. Soc. Netw. 31 (2), 126–137.
Lindelauf, Roy, Borm, Peter, Hamers, Herbert, 2012. One-Mode projection analysis
and  design of covert afﬁliation networks. Soc. Netw. 34 (4), 614–622.
Please cite this article in press as: Gutfraind, A., Genkin, M.,  A graph database framework for covert network analysis: An application to
the Islamic State network in Europe. Soc. Netw. (2017), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.socnet.2016.10.004
ARTICLE IN PRESSG ModelSON-981; No. of Pages 11
A. Gutfraind, M. Genkin / Social Networks xxx (2017) xxx–xxx 11
Medina, Richard., 2014. Social network analysis: a case study of the islamist
terrorist network. Sec. J. 27, 97–121.
Miller, Justin J., 2013. Graph database applications and concepts with neo4j.
Atlanta, GA, USA In: Proceedings of the Southern Association for Information
Systems Conference, 2324.
Morselli, Carlo, Giguère, Cynthia, Petit, Katia, 2007. The Efﬁciency/Security
trade-Off in criminal networks. Soc. Netw. 29 (1), 143–153.
Morselli, Carlo., 2009. Inside Criminal Networks. Springer, New York, NY.
Newman, M.E.J., Girvan, M.,  2004. Finding and evaluating community structure in
networks. Phys. Rev. E 69 (2), 026113.
Parlapiano, Alicia Andrews, Haeyoun, Wilson Park, Larry, Buchanan, Sarah,
Almukhtar, 2015. Unraveling the Connections Among the Paris Attackers. New
York Times 2016, Retrieved: 04.04.16 (http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/
2015/11/15/world/europe/manhunt-for-paris-attackers.html? r=1).
Robins, Garry L., 2015. Doing Social Network Research: Network-Based Research
Design for Social Scientists. Sage Publications Ltd, Los Angeles, CA.
Robinson, Ian, Webber, Jim, Eifrem, Emil, 2015. Graph Databases: New
Opportunities for Connected Data: Sebastopol. O’Reilly Media, CA: Sebastopol,
CA.
Rodriguez, A. Jose, 2004. The March 11th Terrorist Network: In Its Weakness Lies
Its  Strength. Working Papers EPP-LEA. University of Barcelona, Spain.
Rotella, Sebastian, 2016. The Dark Side of Privacy: How ISIS Communications Go
Undetected Paciﬁc Standard, Retrieved: 30.07.16 https://psmag.com/the-dark-
side-of-privacy-how-isis-communications-go-undetected-890aec4e86c3#.
6pa3fargo.
Rubin, J. Alissa, 2015. Cellphone Contacts in Paris Attacks Suggest Foreign
Coordination. New York Times (Retrieved: 04.04.16) http://www.nytimes.
com/2015/12/31/world/europe/cellphone-contacts-in-paris-attacks-suggest-
foreign-coordination.html? r=0.
START, 2013. Global Terrorism Database [Data File], Retrieved from http://www.
start.umd.edu/gtd.
Sageman, Marc, 2004. Understanding Terror Networks. University of Pennsylvania
Press, Philadelphia, PA.
Schmitt, Eric, Schmidt, S. Michael, Higgins, Andrew, 2015. Al Qaeda Trained
Suspect in Paris Terror Attack, Ofﬁcial Says. New York Times, Retrieved:
04.04.16 http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/09/world/europe/paris-terror-
attack-suspects.htm.
Watts, Clint, 2016. Deciphering Competition Between Al-Qa‘ida and the Islamic
State, 9., 7 CTC Sentinel., West Point, NY, pp. 1–6.
Webber, Jim, 2012. A programmatic introduction to neo4j. In: Proceedings of the
3rd Annual Conference on Systems, Programming, and Applications: Software
for Humanity, ACM, pp. 217–218.
Xu, Jennifer, Chen, Hsinchun, 2008. The topology of dark networks. Commun. ACM
51  (10), 58–65.
Zouzias, Anastasios, Michail, Vlachos, Vagelis, Hristidis, 2014. Templated search
over relational databases. In: Proceedings of the 23rd ACM International
Conference on Conference on Information and Knowledge Management, ACM,
pp. 21–30.
